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ABSTRACT Inferences from the absence of evidence to something are common in ordinary
speech, but when used in scientific argumentations are usually considered deficient or out-
right false. Yet, as demonstrated here with the help of various examples, archaeologists
frequently use inferences and reasoning from absence, often allowing it a status on par with
inferences from tangible evidence. This discrepancy has not been examined so far. The article
analyses it drawing on philosophical discussions concerning the validity of inference from
absence, using probabilistic models that were originally developed to show that such infer-
ences are weak and inconclusive. The analysis reveals that inference from absence can
indeed be justified in many important situations of archaeological research, such as exca-
vations carried out to explore the past existence and time-span of sedentary human habi-
tation. The justification is closely related to the fact that archaeology explores the human past
via its material remains. The same analysis points to instances where inference from absence
can have comparable validity in other historical sciences, and to research questions in which
archaeological inference from absence will be problematic or totally unwarranted.
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‘Argumentum ad ignorantiam … is fallacious in every
context but one. The exception is the court of law, where
the guiding principle is that a person is presumed innocent
until proven guilty’ (Copi, 1953)
‘Now, and with considerably more information on the
presence and/or absence of domestic/managed animals
from archaeological sites … I reassess the zooarchaeological
evidence for domestic animal introductions with some of
the earliest proposed agricultural communities in the
region’ (Piper, 2017)
The argument for or against a hypothesis from lack of evi-dence to something—known interchangeably as “argumentfrom ignorance,” “argument from silence,” or “inference
from absence”1,2 —has a bad reputation in epistemology. The
maxim “Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” was
popularised by Carl Sagan3 (Sagan and Druyan, 1997, p. 213), but
the concept probably dates back to antiquity. Locke (1690)
categorised arguments from lack of evidence as dialectical rather
than epistemic, and a Jewish religious ruling from the second
century AD4 states that even when offered by an expert, such an
argument is unacceptable.
Nevertheless, people often infer and argue from the absence of
evidence in everyday life: “I don’t see her car in the parking lot, so
she must be elsewhere.” “We know that Saddam Hussein did not
possess weapons of mass destruction, since inspectors did not
find any.” In the sciences, however, inference from absence is
usually considered invalid, or at best weak and inconclusive.
Section “Why science (usually) won’t take no for an answer”
demonstrates this attitude and examines the difference between
science and everyday discourse in this respect. A necessary con-
dition for inference from absence of evidence to have a respect-
able plausibility is that the evidence is highly expected, a situation
that is not uncommon in quotidian discourse but hard to come by
in scientific research.
In archaeology, however, inference-from-absence arguments
are quite common, as the examples in the next section demon-
strate. Inferences for the timing of past events, processes, and
state of affairs, either in the form of terminus ad quem or of
terminus post quem (a date before or after which something
happened or existed), often depend crucially on the absence of
evidence from a particular period. Under certain conditions
archaeologist even make—and accept—inferences not only from
absence but also from a paucity of evidence, rejecting single or
just-a-few traces as intrusive or residual (belonging to a later or
earlier period than the context under investigation) and therefore
inconsequential.
This exceptional prevalence of inference from absence in
archaeology has so far escaped the notice of archaeologists and
philosophers. The question that this article intends to examine is:
Is this practice justified, or is it just scandalous negligence of
sound logical principles?
As shall be shown below, there is indeed dissimilarity in this
respect between archaeology and other sciences, including dis-
ciplines (such as palaeontology and historiography) that are
considered comparable or close to archaeology. The dissimilarity
stems from characteristics that pertain to the nature of archae-
ology as a discipline that seeks to reconstruct the human past via
its material remains.
As shall be discussed in Section “The distinctiveness of
archaeology”, both elements—human past activity and material
traces thereof—are of import here. It is their combination that
creates situations in which evidence is highly expected, and
therefore, its absence is highly significant. This explains why
archaeologists often accept such inferences as legitimate—though
of course, not infallible—arguments. In other historical sciences
similar situations, though possible, are much less common.
Section “The distinctiveness of archaeology” presents this
argument in details, and section “A probabilistic model” explores
the same issue through a probabilistic model adopted from Sober
(2009) and McGrew (2014). Section “Limitations of archae-
ological inference from absence” discusses some limitations to
archaeological inference from absence. Although useful and
legitimate for addressing several important questions about the
human past, there are conditions under which it can be proble-
matic or entirely inapplicable. Section “Only in archaeology?”
uses the same analysis to identify circumstances favourable for
inference from absence in other historical sciences. The last sec-
tion summarises the argument and concludes with some general
remarks.
Inference from absence in archaeology
Below are several examples of how archaeologists use inference
from absence in their work:
i. A review (Roebroeks and Villa, 2011) of evidence for the use
of fire by early humans in Europe supported a conclusion that
habitual use of fire did not emerge there until the second half
of the Middle Pleistocene, 300–400 thousand years ago.
This result is surprising, given the climatic conditions in
northern latitudes. The authors maintain, however, that it is
solid: “Cave sequences spanning the latter part of the Early
Pleistocene and the earlier part of the Middle Pleistocene in
Europe do not have convincing evidence of fire. The number
and quality of these early sites are significant, and this absence
of evidence cannot be ignored.”
ii. Hypotheses about the timing and the dispersion routes of
early hominins from Africa to Eurasia and beyond are
supported not only by the presence but also by the absence of
human material remains. Chronological gaps in the
sequences of fossils and artefacts point to several waves of
colonisation, as well as to extinctions of some early migratory
lineages (Bar-Yosef and Belfer-Cohen, 2001; López et al.,
2015). Similarly, gaps in the archaeological record in Middle
Palaeolithic sites in Northwestern Europe (Hublin and
Roebroeks, 2009) are interpreted as hiatuses in human
presence, probably due to interspersed regional extinction.
iii. Archaeological investigations of the origins and dispersal of
agriculture rely on inference from absence to determine the
earliest appearance of domesticated plants and animals in
various regions.
Several factors, like the perishability of organic material
(cf. section “Limitations of archaeological inference from
absence”) and the difficulty of distinguishing between wild
and domesticated strains, make such determinations difficult.
Nevertheless, evidence for absence of domesticated strains in
archaeological sites plays an important and sometimes
crucial role in the formulation and adjudication of
hypotheses about the timing and origins of Neolithization.
The recognition that “the striking fact remains that the
Nile Valley cannot be demonstrated to have been settled by
agriculturalists until about 5500–5000 BC” (Bellwood, 2005)
put an end to the once-popular theory (Childe, 1934, pp.
49–84) that pre-dynastic Egypt was the locus of the earliest
agriculturalists. Remarkably, absolute absence is not always
mandatory for such arguments. For example, Fuller (2006, p.
16) deduced from “the (near)5 absence of wheat and barley”
in certain archaeological deposits in the Indus valley that
these cereals “may only have been imported to certain
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0307-9
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |            (2019) 5:94 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0307-9 | www.nature.com/palcomms
townsites … Although wheat is a significant crop in the
region today, this must have developed in post-Harappan
times.”
iv. In the early 1930s, a young archaeologist stunned her
colleagues (as well as many laymen) when she reported
(Marquet-Krause, 1934, 1935) that her excavations at the
mound of Et-Tell in Palestine, generally recognised as the site
of biblical Ai, did not expose material remains from the
Middle Bronze or Late Bronze Ages (but only from earlier
and later periods). These results were sufficient to convince
many contemporary scholars that the events detailed in Jos.
7–8 did not happen. Thirty years later, an expanded
excavation by another archaeologist (Callaway, 1968) at the
same site confirmed Marquet-Krause’s conclusion and his
soundings at several alternative locations for biblical Ai
showed, by similar evidence-from-absence arguments, that
none of them was inhabited in the relevant period.
Actually, Marquet-Krause (1934) mentioned finding a few
sherds that might belong to the Middle Bronze Age, and
another archaeologist (Garstang, 1931) reported finding a
Late Bronze potsherd there. As more data from the site was
gathered, however, these finds were deemed singular,
out-of-context and, therefore, irrelevant.
v. Reviewing archaeological findings from sites mentioned in
the Egyptian execration texts dated to Middle Bronze IIA,
Ben-Tor (2006) noted that in quite a few of them “No major
public construction datable to MB IIA was encountered…
not one of them was fortified.” He concluded that these texts
could not provide reliable information on the inhabitation
map, or the Egyptian involvement, in the Western Levant at
that period. To explain the discrepancy, he suggested that the
placenames in the texts were copied from similar ones
written in an earlier period - an instance of ancient fake news.
vi. In his seminal article “The Date of the Settlement of the
Philistines in Canaan” Finkelstein (1995) suggested that this
date should be lowered by about half a century. This
inference is derived from the absence of sherds of locally
made Philistine ware, and specifically of the early (mono-
chrome) type, in strata that yielded traces from the reign of
Ramses III.6 Since the distinctive Philistine ceramics are
often used to date strata in other sites, these conclusions
have far-reaching historiographical implications. Scholars
(e.g., Mazar, 1997) who rejected Finkelstein’s suggestion did
not dispute the “evidence from absence” in itself, but what it
is evidence for. The lack of Philistine material remains in
particular strata, they argued, is evidence of a territorial,
demographic, and cultural separation rather than of a
chronological one.
vii. The absence of zooarchaeological as well as artistic evidence
of domesticated camels in the southern Levant during the
Bronze Age prompted even a conservative scholar like W.F.
Albright (1940, p. 196; 1968), who famously strived to
establish the historicity of the biblical narratives, to
conclude that early biblical references to camels (e.g., Gen.
24) were anachronistic. Modern research reconfirmed this
conclusion, again using a form of evidence from absence.
Sapir-Hen and Ben-Yosef (2013) report that in the Araba
valley in Israel “camel bones in substantial quantities appear
only in contexts dated to the last third of the 10th century”
and conclude that this enables “to pinpoint the introduction
of camels to the Southern Levant” to this time.
The wording “in substantial quantities” is significant here. A
single bone fragment from a lower stratum (Sapir-Hen and Ben-
Yosef, 2013, p. 279n) was considered insufficient to change the
conclusion.
These examples demonstrate that inference and argumentation
from absence and from paucity play an important role in
archaeology. Notwithstanding the adage “absence of evidence is
not evidence of absence,” archaeologists often advance, debate
and accept inference from absence in a way that is exceptional
when compared to other sciences.
This does not imply, of course, that archaeological inference
from absence will always be correct. Like any empirical inference,
it is fallible and can be revised in light of later discoveries or
further analysis. The point is, rather, that archaeology often treats
inference from absence of evidence as legitimate and comparable
to inference from tangible evidence. The question addressed
below is whether this practice is epistemically sound.
Why science (usually) won’t take no for an answer
Speaking of the ability of the historical sciences to inform us
about the past, Sober (1988) observed that
the knowability of the past depends on whether the physical
processes linking past to present are information preserving
or information destroying; this cannot be known a priory,
but depends on the specific processes at work and on data
available to the scientist.
Turner (2007, p. 53) pointed out that adverse situations are
more common:
many historical processes—the fossilisation process, the
processes of weathering and erosion, continental drift,
subduction, glaciation, and so on—are information-
destroying processes, rather like housecleaning and docu-
ment shredding.
This irretrievable loss of information is, according to Turner,
one reason to expect that hypotheses about the past will usually
be strongly underdetermined (our inability to manipulate the
past, which does not concern us here, is another).7
In a recent book Currie (2018) elaborates on this observation
by introducing a “ripple model” for the survival and usability of
traces of past event and state-of-affairs: Normally, such traces are
progressively degraded, both qualitatively and quantitatively, after
their creation. The remaining record will suffer from “gappiness”
when traces are destroyed, and also from “faintness” which is the
result of both the relative difficulty of locating extant traces and of
linking them to past events.
Ceteris paribus, faintness increases through time. Ceteris
paribus, gappiness increases through time. Ceteris paribus,
the higher the faintness or gappiness of an event’s traces,
the less retrievable the event. As time goes by, information
about past events degrades to the point of erasure (p. 121).
Currie characterises such situations as “unlucky circum-
stances”: “Events in the past with high gappiness and faintness,
unless offset by high dispersal, will have a low retrievability”
(p. 125). His main objective is to demonstrate that scientists can
and do deliver worthwhile “epistemic goods” which may include
—but are not limited to—truths about the past, but he agrees that
lack of evidence is restrictive: “an absence of traces can occa-
sionally distinguish between historical hypotheses, but this is
tricky. Sober (2009) has a nice probabilistic discussion of just this
point.”
Scientific inferences from absence are usually treated as pro-
blematic, if not outright fallacious. Here are some examples to
this attitude, with particular attention to disciplines that, like
archaeology, use extant traces to support reconstructions of past
events and circumstances:
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i. Sober (2009), mentioned above, analysed inference from
absence in palaeontology and evolutionary biology. Using a
probabilistic model (to be explored in section “A probabilistic
model”) Sober showed that inferences of separate ancestry
from the failure to find intermediate forms in the fossil
record, though valid in principle, are very weak. Forber and
Griffith (2011) used the same model to show that the
disappearance of a taxon from the fossil record close to a
mass extinction event is insufficient to prove that the taxon
perished at this event, rather than at some prior time. Cleland
(2013) asserts that the opposite is also true: “Failure to find
ammonite fossils sufficiently close to the lower level of the
K-Pg boundary in a particular location does not preclude the
possibility of finding them elsewhere,” and therefore, such
failure does not disprove a hypothesis about their later
extinction. Currie and Turner (2017) offered a more nuanced
approach: Some inferences from absence are more reasonable
than others. They discuss the cases of the coelacanths, ancient
fishes that were considered extinct because their traces
disappeared from the fossil record 66 million years ago, but
were spotted alive in the 20th century. Obviously, an
inference from absence was faulty in this case. On the other
hand, it is highly plausible that the lack of evidence of extant
Pterodactyls (oddball “sightings” notwithstanding) is due to
the fact that these Jurassic flying reptiles perished long ago.
ii. Discussing inference from absence in geology, Watson (1982)
stated that inference for a geologic removal process can only
be valid “if the argument is coupled with further evidence
that the rocks were in fact once there” and therefore “one
cannot assume from the absence of something that it never
was there.” Clealand (2016) applied similar reasoning to
reject a hypothesis that drumlins (a certain type of
landforms) were all created by the same process. Even
though no evidence exists for other ways of formation, this
absence “cannot be used to justify the conclusion that there is
only one way of making it. Additional justification is
required.”
iii. In Historiography the question of “inference from silence”—
that is, inferring that an event did not happen because it is
never mentioned in any historical document—received
much, and generally negative, attention. Newall (2009)
denounced it as “the fallacy of negative proof.” Henige
(2006) pointed out that “A past event has to be witnessed,
then the observations recorded, the record preserved for
varying periods of time, then found, and finally understood.
… the degree of disappearance has been phenomenally
high.” A lot of historical evidence, therefore “cannot
realistically ever become available” and argument based
upon their absence is “fatally weak.” These observations
serve as a starting point for a Bayesian analysis by McGrew
(2014), discussed in section “A probabilistic model” below.
The aversion to inference from absence is not confined to
historical science. The century-long search for the detection of
gravitational waves (Waldrop, 2016), for example, was not
deterred by many negative (or refuted) results. It was the search
for extraterrestrial life which motivated Rees and Sagan to state
that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” and articles
making use of this adage to argue for the inconclusiveness of
negative evidence can be found in scientific literature ranging
from medicine (Altman and Bland, 1995) to astronomy (Cooper
et al., 2010).
Scientific versus quotidian inference from absence. It is useful
to juxtapose this negative attitude with the high tolerance for
inference from absence in everyday life. We are convinced that
there were no WMD in Iraq. Noticing that the morning grass is
dry, we assume that the night was rainless, etc.
Several philosophers attempted to vindicate inference from
absence by pointing to circumstances under which it may be
correct or at least plausible. Two lines of thoughts in this
direction, independent but convergent in their main conclusions,
were developed by Walton (1992, 1996) and by Goldberg
(2010, 2011).8 The main point in both these approaches is the
following: Such inference is plausible if, or to amount that, the
one making it is in the position to say (paraphrasing Goldberg,
2011) “If it were true, I would have had good evidence for it by
now.” The inference from absence of evidence is reasonable only
if the evidence is highly expected.9 This seemingly simple
condition, called “epistemic closure” and “epistemic coverage”
by Walton and Goldberg, respectively, is the key to differentiating
between situations where inference from absence is warranted
and those in which it has low plausibility.
In many circumstances of scientific research, however, claims
of the type “if P were true, we would have ample evidence to it.
Therefore, P is probably false” cannot be justified.
Historiographers (Henige, 2006; Newall, 2009) recognise that
the lack of reference to something in extant texts can happen for
many reasons—past writer might not have bothered to mention
it,10 written materials could have been lost or destroyed, etc.—and
therefore does not prove, or even give much support to, the
assumption that it did not happen. Geologists (Watson, 1982)
reckon that multiple destructive processes—subduction, erosion,
uplift, volcanism, etc.—shaped the earth’s crust so that the
absence of a particular feature can seldom be casually indicative.
For evolutionary biologists and palaeontologists, the rareness of
fossils implies that the absence of evidence for a species does not
prove that it did not exist.11 Finally, the large dimensions and
complexity of outer space dictate that our epistemic coverage
(sensu Goldberg) is unavoidably limited; hence Sagan’s (Sagan
and Druyan, 1997) criticism of “impatience with ambiguity” with
Rees’ dictum mentioned above.
That is why arguments and inferences from absence are rare in
the sciences (including, for that matter, historiography) even
though they are fairly common in everyday discourse.
Archaeology, as demonstrated in the previous section, is an
exception in this respect: Archaeologists often posit, consider, and
accept inferences from the absence of evidence, on par with
inferences from tangible evidence. The next section explains why
this is so, and the following one supports and expands this
analysis with a quantitative model.
The distinctiveness of archaeology
Given the prevalence of inference from absence in archaeology, in
absolute terms and certainly in comparison to other sciences, it is
surprising that the question of its epistemic justification was not
examined so far. Treatises on the philosophy of archaeology like
Salmon (1982), Wylie (2002), and Chapman and Wylie (2016) do
not discuss it. In the more general context of the historical sci-
ences, the perception of inference from absence is, as we saw in
section “Why science (usually) won’t take no for an answer”,
largely unfavourable.
The ability of archaeology to reason from absence of evidence
stems from the coincidence of two factors, which are closely
related to the nature of archaeology as a science that explores the
human past via the discovery and interpretation of its surviving
material remains. These factors are (1) the strong footprint of
human existence and (2) the high degree of survivability (over the
relevant timescale) of many types of human material remains.
These factors and their implications are discussed below, and a
simplified mathematical model thereof is presented in the next
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section. Their combined effect is that for many issues of interest
to archaeologists a claim of the type “if P were true, we would
have evidence for it” can be justified. As discussed in the previous
section, under such circumstances inferences from absence have
an epistemic standing that is comparable to other empirical
inferences.
i. Human presence has a strong and distinctive footprint: All
living species perturb their environment, but people—ever
since the earliest members of the genus Homo—do something
more: they produce, use, and discard plenty of artefacts of all
kinds. Foley and Lahr (2015) estimated that during the period
of stone tool evolution humans were producing between 10
and a 100 stone tools per person per year, with each
production accompanied by a débitage of many detectable
(larger than 2 cm) flakes. Citing a survey of a region of central
Sahara, they report an average density of 75 artefacts per
square meter.
A footprint is not only a matter of quantity but also of
distinctiveness. Except perhaps to the very earliest human
stone tools, which were claimed to resemble natural (Barnes,
1939) or monkey-made (Proffitt et al. 2016) flakes, human
artefacts are usually dissimilar enough from their environ-
ment to make them easily discernible to the trained eye of the
archaeologist.
Later stages of human evolution brought an ever-
increasing demographic growth, technological advancement,
and societal development, with the concomitant result of
stronger and more localised footprints. To cite just one
example, the transformation from small mobile groups typical
to the upper Palaeolithic to sedentary groups in the Natufian
culture resulted in localities with concentrations of masonry
and lithic artefacts significantly higher than in the previous
eras (Belfer-Cohen and Goring-Morris, 2011). This trend of
intensification in the number, diversity, and concentration of
human material remains continued in subsequent periods.
The development of human cognitive capabilities also
tended to increase the distinctiveness of human artefacts, both
in the sense of making them dissimilar from the environment
and in making style and technology more idiosyncratic,
enhancing not only the human footprint per se but also the
possibility to associate artefacts with their past users.
ii. Many types of human material remains have high surviva-
bility: Human artefacts produced from inorganic materials,
though not totally unperishable, have a reasonable chance of
leaving material traces that will withstand the elements of
nature and destruction by humans. Even mud-brick
constructions often survive, and things made of stone, bone,
ceramic, or metal usually fare better. (As for organic residues,
see section “Limitations of archaeological inference from
absence” below.)
To use Currie’s (2018, p. 125) terminology, many archae-
ological traces are neither particularly “gappy” (because a high
proportion of the original stuff, abundant in itself, is likely to
survive) nor very “faint” (because the traces are distinct and stable
midrange theories12 to interpret them exist). Research circum-
stances, including the methodology and technology employed,
determine what proportion of human traces can be retrieved by
archaeologists.
Archaeological argumentations from absence are sometimes
questioned by pointing to the possibility of complete removal of
human traces by post-depositional natural erosion or human
activities. Interestingly and unlike what normally happens in
other sciences, in archaeology it is usually the rebuttal of infer-
ence from absence which needs to be specifically supported by
pointing to special environmental or historical circumstances that
could produce such an effect. For example, when archaeological
excavations failed to discover the remains of a biblical Ai and the
walls of Jericho, the possibility of total post-depositional removal
was suggested but was generally regarded as ad hoc and
unconvincing.13
To conclude, it is the combination of two features—human
origin and physical nature—of their evidentiary stuff, that create
situations in which inferences from absence of evidence have a
respectable plausibility. Not all questions of interest to archae-
ologist fall under this category (cf. section “Limitations of
archaeological inference from absence” below), but many
important ones do.
Archaeological inferences from absence are particularly effec-
tive when applied to questions of the type “who/what was here
and when” which are central to much of the archaeological
thinking. A sedentary or semi-sedentary human presence can be
expected to result in a large number of discernible material
remains at their site of living. Therefore, when a systematic and
extensive search fails to discover such remains (of a particular
period), this constitutes plausible evidence from absence that the
site was uninhabited during this period. If traces of earlier and/or
later periods are found there, an inference of terminus ad quem/
post quem may be derived. As the examples in section “Inference
from absence in archaeology” demonstrate, this can sometimes
have the effect of a “smoking gun” (Cleland, 2002, 2011, 2013): a
previously unexpected signal that makes the total body of evi-
dence better explained by one hypothesis about the past than by
others.
The problem of “evidentiary noise” and inference from pau-
city. Even when archaeological traces survive, their context may
change: Post-depositional processes such as erosion and human
activity can dislocate traces from their original context. Orton and
Hughes (2013, p. 222) warned archaeologists that
A point which is so obvious that it may seem not worth
making is that the date of a pot or a sherd is not necessarily
the date of the archaeological context in which it was found.
… Between its original breakage and discard and its final
resting place, it may have undergone several events (such as
sweeping-up, removal to a rubbish pit, disturbance of that
pit, and so on) … There are thus two potential problems:
sherds which are later than their context (intrusiveness) and
sherds which are older than their context (residuality) … it
is something of which anyone working with archaeological
ceramics should be acutely aware.
In other words, archaeologists must consider the possibility
that they will also encounter some false positive evidence or
“noise” in the form of traces that “should not have been there.”
This is a situation that many discussions of inference from
absence neglect, but as the citation above shows, is part and parcel
of archaeological reality.
Usually, out-of-context traces can be assumed to be few and far
between. This is the rationale behind the archaeological practice
of considering singular, out-of-context finds (as in examples (iii),
(iv) and (vii) in section “Inference from absence in archaeology”)
as outliers, treating paucity of evidence as lack thereof. This
practice may be justified in some circumstances and erroneous in
others, as discussed below.
A probabilistic model
Formal probabilistic approaches were applied to the problem of
inference from absence by several scholars, each focusing on a
specific context. Oaksford and Hahn (2004) formulated Walton’s
theory in Bayesian terms using reasoning about drugs’ safety as
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an example. Sober (2009) applied likelihoodist analysis in the
context of palaeontology and evolutionary biology, exploring the
validity of inferring separate ancestry of two lineages from the
failure to find an intermediate fossil. Sober’s model was discussed
by Strevens (2009) and used by Forber and Griffith (2011) to
enquire whether the disappearance of a genus from the fossil
record can indicate the time of its extinction. Stephens (2011)
used Bayesian analysis to show that under some assumptions
inference from absence may be plausible14, and McGrew (2014)
examined inference from silence in historiography (the inference
that something that is not mentioned in extant sources did not
happen) through Bayesian analysis.
Notwithstanding their dissimilarities, these treatises share two
results: First, contrary to the Rees/Sagan maxim, absence of evi-
dence is some evidence for absence.15 Second, it is usually very
weak evidence, and therefore inference from absence will usually
be inconclusive.
To show why in archaeological research the second result often
does not hold, I will use a model tailored on Sober’s, referring to
McGrew′s version when relevant. The analysis in this section will
also elucidate the rationale behind the archaeological practice of
inferring from paucity, mentioned above. The following section
points to circumstances in which archaeological inference from
absence can be problematic or totally unwarranted. Finally, Sec-
tion “Only in archaeology?” looks for situations favourable for
inference from absence in other historical sciences.
Site excavation. Let us consider first the following common
situation: Archaeologists try to determine whether a site was
inhabited during a particular period by excavating there and
looking for traces (human material remains) from that period.
For this example, it is assumed that the putative human presence
of the site was substantial and relatively long (a generation
or more).
Modern archaeological excavation is a planned undertaking, in
which the area to be explored is parcelled into small units. Each
square is then slowly and meticulously exposed, and an attempt is
made to extract and record every single artefact; techniques like
sieving and flotation are sometimes used for better recovery.
Definitions and notations. Let H denote the hypothesis that the
site was inhabited at the relevant period and ~H the hypothesis
that it was not. E is the event of finding relevant evidence sup-
porting H, and ~E the event of finding none.
Let p be the likelihood that an adequate trace exists in the site,
assuming it was indeed inhabited. Because of the strong human
footprint and the good survivability of many types of human
material remains, discussed in the previous section, a site that was
inhabited by humans for an appreciable time is expected to
contain many human artefacts. We shall therefore initially
assume, like Sober, that p= 1 (this assumption shall be modified
later).
Let q be the likelihood that a stray trace from the same period
exists in the site even though the site was not inhabited during the
period in question. This “noise” probability can be the result of
post-depositional processes that, as the citation form Orton and
Hughes above shows, cannot be neglected in archaeological
research.16
Finally, let α be the probability of detecting a trace (if such
exists). Following Sober (2009, 71 8n) and Strevens (2009, p. 99)
we can assume that the existence of a trace “screens off” its
discovery from the competing hypotheses. That is, the detection
probability α is a function of the technology and the research
method applied but independent of whether the site was or was
not inhabited during the relevant period.17 The likelihood of
finding an appropriate trace in the site, then, equals α if the site
was occupied and equals α·q if it was not. The likelihoods of not
finding one are 1−α and 1−α·q, respectively.
The strength of inference from absence18 —that is, of inferring
~H from ~E—is measured by the likelihood ratio: P(~E|~H)/P
(~E|H).19 The higher the ratio, the safer the inference.
Let R− denote this ratio. Using the notations above, we get
R ¼ 1 αqð Þ= 1 αð Þ ð1Þ
Sober as well as Forber and Griffith discuss situations, typical
to palaeontology, where α is low. Indeed, finding fossilised
specimen, especially one of a “missing link” or rare genus, is
difficult; that is why such discoveries get front-page coverage.
Under such circumstances, the likelihood ratio (for any value of
q) is a little greater than one. For example, if α= 0.1 and q= 0.1
(as in Forber and Griffith, 2011, 14n) one gets R−= 1.1. The
inference from absence has some force since the likelihood ratio R
− is greater than one, but it is weak and inconclusive. In Currie’s
(2108) words, an absence of fossils can be a geological signal,
revelatory of fossilisation and preservation processes, rather than
a biological signal informative about life’s history.
For an orderly archaeological excavation, however, the
probability of detecting a trace, if such exists in the site, is
significant because such traces are easily distinguishable and the
search is localised and intensive. For α= 0.8 and q= 0. 1, for
example, we get R− ≈ 5. Increasing the probability of detection
(for example through the use of sieving) will result in higher
values of R−. Under such circumstances, inference from absence
cannot be discarded as inconclusive but must be considered as
any other empirical inference.
McGrew (2014, p. 221), discussing evidence from absence in
historiography, even notes that since R− can be written as P(~E|
~H)/[1−P(E|H)] “there is no limit on the strength of argument
from silence” because when E is very probable under H the
denominator approaches zero. As he convincingly shows,
however, for historiographic texts P(E|H) will typically be small
—there are many possible causes for an event not to get
mentioned in the extant documents and therefore in historio-
graphy “the argument from silence will have very little force.”
Before going further, it is worth recapping what was shown so
far: Models (Sober, 2009; McGrew, 2014) created to demonstrate
that inference from absence of historical traces is weak and
inconclusive, show that under conditions typical to archaeological
excavations such inference can have a respectable plausibility.
Absence and objectivity. Strevens (2009), commenting on Sober,
offers an alternative analysis: The absence of evidence is (typi-
cally) not epistemically objective evidence of absence, and there-
fore unacceptable in scientific reasoning. Epistemic objectivity
comes in degrees, and Strevens’ measure for the objectivity of
evidence is proportional to the objectivity of the relevant like-
lihoods, or of their ratios. The more their values depend on the
probabilities of auxiliary hypotheses, which different scientists
may asses differently, the less objective they are.
Strevens observes that evaluating the likelihood of a separate
ancestry of two lineages from the failure to find an intermediate
fossil involves making a lot of assumptions about the past
geographical distribution of all possible intermediate species and
their chances of fossilisation and preservation. The value of the
likelihood ratio P(~E|~H)/P(~E|H) for separate ancestry hypoth-
esis, therefore, will be highly subjective and the inference from
absence will be of inferior value.20
Things are different for a regular, systematic archaeological
excavation that seeks to answer the question “Was this site
occupied at the period T?” or a similar one. As explained above,
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we are concerned with situations in which the probability of
discovering a trace (if such exists) is high and the probability of
the existence of traces given past inhabitation is very high. Under
such conditions, there would not be many “excuses” (explana-
tions based on auxiliary hypotheses) for not discovering any trace
in a previously inhabited site, and the inference from absence
would be reasonably objective. Stated differently, an epistemic
community that accepts (as most archaeologists would certainly
do) that human footprint is usually strong and many of its traces
are distinct and therefore retrievable would accept an inference of
~H as objective (though defeasible) whenever the search is
sufficiently intensive and returns negative results.
Surface foot-walking survey is another method of archaeological
research for discovering and identifying traces of past human
settlements. Here, however, the probability of detection is usually
lower. If we assume α= 0.2 (the lower value mentioned by
Banning et al. (2017) for a transect of ±2 m),21 we get (with q, as
before, 0.1) R− ≈ 1.25.
This indicates that Inference from absence from a single survey
sweep is not well supported. Appropriately, Banning (2002, pp.
204–205) warns that “just because a survey finds no artefacts
diagnostic of some other period does not ensure that the site was
unoccupied during that period.”
Uncommon traces, common false traces and the inference from
paucity. It was assumed above that that if a site was occupied in
the period of interest, the probability of human material remains
being there is unity. This approximation is adequate for mundane
artefacts, such as sherds of domestic vessels, which should be
present in great quantity if the site was inhabited for an appre-
ciable time. But archaeologists sometimes look for rare but highly
indicative traces, for example when the dating of the site’s
occupation is in doubt.
Let p (now, smaller than one) be the probability that such rare
traces exist in the explored site if it was inhabited at the relevant
period; the likelihoods of finding and missing it, therefore, equal
α·p and 1−α·p, respectively. The corresponding likelihoods of
“noise detection” if the site was unoccupied at the relevant period
are, as before, α·q and 1−α·q.
The likelihood ratio for the inference from absence becomes:
R ¼ P  Ej  Hð Þ=P  EjHð Þ ¼ 1 αqð Þ= 1 αpð Þ ð2Þ
where E now means “finding just a single (or very few) rare and
indicative traces.” Here, however, we must also consider the
strength of a positive inference. How certain can we be, finding a
single rare trace, that the site was occupied in the relevant period?
Denote the appropriate likelihood ratio by R+:
Rþ ¼ P EjHð Þ=P Ej  Hð Þ ¼ p=q ð3Þ
The support for both a positive inference given a find and for a
negative inference after none was found is smaller than when
traces are very abundant, and p practically equals one.22 Both
ratios approach unity when p gets closer to q, the background
probability of archaeological “noise.” This is one reason why
archaeologists often regard a single exceptional trace (as in
example (iv) in section “Inference from absence in archaeology”)
as inconsequential.
Another situation in which the discovery of just a few traces can
be equivocal is when the “noise” is expected to be significant (in our
model, this corresponds to a relatively high value of q). Cereals
might have been imported to the Indian subcontinent, and wild
camels roamed the Levantine deserts, before they were domesticated
there (examples (iii) and (vii) in section “Inference from absence in
archaeology”). The probability of encountering remains from these
pre-domestication phenomena cannot be assumed to be negligible.
Increase in the value of the “noise probability” q diminishes
both R+ and R−, but not in the same amount. In fact, for high
values of q (and of α, as typical for archaeological excavations) the
negative inference, given a single piece of evidence, may be better
supported than the positive one.23 This simple reasoning explains
why Fuller, Ben Yosef and Hen-Sapir, and many other
archaeologists often treat paucity of evidence as practical absence,
drawing an inference from absence thereof.
If we demand that the number of relevant traces found exceeds
a specified minimum then the likelihoods, expressed in
cumulative distributions and their complementary functions, will
be too complicated to capture in the simple formalism used here.
But the following will be generally true: An increase in the “cutoff
number” of relevant traces required for a positive inference (i.e.,
that the hypothesis under research is true) will make the positive
inference stronger and the negative one less secure. This can
result in a false negative inference.
Limitations of archaeological inference from absence
At the risk of stating the obvious, let me stress that even under the
best conditions inference from absence will just be an (abductive)
empirical inference, and as such defeasible by future evidence or
analysis. (This, of course, only puts it on par with “regular”
inference from positive evidence).
In particular, one must be aware that the justification for
inference from absence, as outlined above, is essentially local since
it rests on the failure to find sought-after evidence in an intensive
localised search.24 A generalisation from the local to the global—
from the excavated area to the whole site, from several sites to a
territorial unit or worldwide—constitutes, logically speaking, an
additional inference that needs to be examined in itself and can be
called into question by findings from other localities.
For example, the “Clovis hypothesis” about the date and route
of human arrival in the Western Hemisphere was for many years
supported by the absence of evidence for human activity in the
Americas before 13,500 years ago in many researched localities in
the Western Hemisphere. Recent discoveries (Goebel et al., 2008;
Holen et al., 2017), have, however, strongly challenged this
hypothesis. Similarly, evidence for extinction of the ammonites
before the Cretaceous–Paleogene boundary, gathered from one
locality, was overturned by results from other places. (Ward,
1990, p. 427; see also Cleland, 2013).
There are also some questions of interest to archaeologists in
which such inference would of be limited applicability, or entirely
unwarranted. Below are several salient examples:
i. Organic materials, being degradable, cannot be assumed to
leave the strong footprint necessary for inference from absence.
Therefore, when archaeologists (as in examples (i) and (iii) in
section “Inference from absence in archaeology”) hypothesise
from the absence of organic material remains, they usually stress
that their inference is based on a very large sample, comprising
many pieces of (negative) evidence. Many artefacts of biological
and botanical origin (e.g., papyri) will survive only under
exceptional circumstances, and their absence cannot, therefore,
support an inference.
ii.The Archaeology of Nomads: Due to their high mobility, low
population density, and transient camping, nomads are often
difficult to identify archaeologically. As Finkelstein and Per-
evolotsky (1990) write:
The nature of nomadism accounts for the dearth of
material remains. … the constant migration permits them
to move only minimal belongings. Moreover, their limited
resources do not facilitate the creation of a flourishing
material culture that could leave rich archaeological finds.
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Ben-Yosef (2016) adds that even complex, stable and relatively
affluent nomadic societies “unless engaged in unique activities
such as mining and smelting, are transparent in common
archaeological practice.” Despite the considerable progress in the
“archaeology of mobility” (Barnard and Wendrich, 2008) sites of
nomads may evade detection. As Smith (2008) reports:
Extensive surveys for Kohe sites have been carried out, even
in areas that they were reported in historical literature …
but none have been found. We have to accept that their
archaeological “invisibility” must be due to their mobility
and transience across the landscape.
Apparently, not much can be adduced from not finding traces
under such circumstances, and inference from absence cannot be
justified.
ii. Questions of identity: The ethnic or social identity of past
people is often not distinguishable in their material remains.
“Even in situations characterised by a high degree of homology
between the habitus and ethnicity, archaeologists may not be
able to find ‘ethnic entities’ reflected in material culture dis-
tributions.” (Jones, 1997, p. 12). Na’aman (1994) discussed the
hypothesis that northern (“Hurrian”) people migrated into
Palestine at the end of the Middle Bronze II. This hypothesis is
supported by distinctive names mentioned in cuneiform tablets
unearthed in Palestine and Egypt, but by only a few, if any,
material remains. He concludes, therefore, that “Archaeological
evidence may corroborate the presence of such groups, but lack
of positive evidence is not enough to deny migration to a certain
place.”
Even in the rare cases in which a clear absence of a particular
identity trait can be demonstrated, the question of what this
absence is evidencing is not easily settled, as shown by example
(vi) in section “Inference from absence in archaeology” above.
Similarly, the lack of pig remains in some locations of Iron-Age
Palestine was interpreted as an indication of an Israelite popu-
lation but is now considered insufficient to support such an
inference (Hesse and Wapnish, 1997; Sapir-Hen et al., 2013).
i. iii Cultural/Cognitive traits and abilities of past people are
only partially and contingently reflected in their material
artefacts. The ability of “cognitive archaeology” to illuminate
them is a matter of contention (Renfrew, 1998; Hodder,
2012), but it is clear that evidence-from-absence arguments
would not be helpful in this context. For example, while grave
goods are typically interpreted as an indication of a belief in
the afterlife, their absence (e.g., in tombs of early Christians)
cannot support a contrary hypothesis.
The list above is not meant to be exhaustive. Archaeological
inference from absence, while having a reasonable validity when
used to probe questions of the type “who was here when” in the
context of sedentary sites and systematic excavation, has a weaker
power in other research circumstances (e.g., field survey) and
none at all when the human material footprint is weak or
equivocal.
Only in archaeology?
For Inference from absence to be plausible, the expectancy of
finding evidence (assuming the existence of the searched-for
phenomenon) should be high. This usually means that both the
probability of existence of evidence (p) and the probability of its
detection (α) are high.
As shown above, the combination of abundance, survivability
(over the relevant time-scale) and distinctiveness of many types of
human material artefacts can create favourable circumstances for
archaeological inference from absence. Looking for similar
situations in other historical sciences, two potential categories can
be outlined:
i. Broad questions: When the question of interest is quite
general and refers to a wide swath of time and/or geography,
it may be reasonable, following an appropriate search, to
consider the absence of evidence as (tentative) evidence for
absence. If no traces of flowering plants were found in
Devonian sediments worldwide, probably none existed then.
ii. For more precise and detailed questions, undisturbed—or
only lightly disturbed—assemblages of abundant traces may
be our best candidates of inference from absence. For
example, Ward (1990), discussing the problem of determin-
ing extinction dates from the fossils record, noted that:
The documented ranges of small, common, and readily
collected species are going to be closer to their actual ranges
than are the observed ranges of rarer species. A corollary of
this is that rarer species will require far more effort in
collection than will the more common species if reliable
range charts are to be determined.
Forber and Griffith (2011, p. 12) also remarked that the
disappearance of high-abundance traces like pollens and
foraminiferans from the fossil record, unlike that of other
species, provides strong support for inferring the time of
their extinction.
In historiography, inference from absence based on intact
archives, especially ones of mundane bureaucratic records,
can have a decent plausibility. Similar situations can be
sought in other historical sciences.
For reasons discussed in section “Why science (usually) won’t
take no for an answer”, these situations are the exception rather
than the rule in most scientific disciplines, which explains why
scientific arguments and inferences from absence are uncommon.
Conclusion
It is a demonstrable fact that inference and reasoning from
absence are common in archaeology, often enjoying a status on
par with other empirical inferences. Archaeologists are usually
not aware that this practice is at variance with other scientific
disciplines.
Our purpose here was to examine if, or under what conditions,
this practice can be epistemically justified. The analysis presented
above showed that the strong footprint that characterised human
communities since early prehistory, combined with the high
survivability and distinguishability of many human artefacts, can
create situations where archaeologists can reasonably expect to
find evidence of past human presence if such existed. Under such
circumstances, inference from absence is plausible. When com-
bined with midrange theories like typology and stratigraphy that
connect archaeological traces to the time and circumstances of
their creation, such negative inferences can factor in the recon-
struction of human history no less than positive inference from
tangible traces.
The examples and discussion above show that such circum-
stances obtain in common and important parts of archaeological
work. In other sciences, similar situations are rare, though not
inconceivable. The analysis offered here can point to potential
candidates.
There are, however, several types of archaeological research
questions in which inference from absence is problematic or
totally unwarranted because the conditions required to justify it
are not met. And even when the archaeological inference from
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absence is reasonably secure, the generalisation from local
absence to global inference must be justified separately.
Archaeologists, as well as historiographers who reason from
their results, must be cognizant of both the justification and the
limitations of archaeological inference from absence.
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Notes
1 I shall be using “inference from absence” except when quoting from sources that use
one of the other terms.
2 Inference from absence should not be confused with eliminative inference. In the
latter, intransigent results—either positive or negative—that cannot be explained by
available hypotheses, motivate the formulation of a novel one. Unlike inference from
absence, instances of eliminative inference appear in all sciences (cf., e.g., Kitcher,
1993, p. 237ff.)
3 The phrase was originally coined by the astronomer Martin Rees.
4 “Rabi Hanina, vice chief of the priests, said: All my days I never saw a hide taken out
to the place of burning…But the sages say: ‘We saw not’ is not a proof, and [such a
hide] must be taken to the place of burning” (Mishna/Nezikin/Eduyot Ch. 2).
5 In one case cited, “there were only 13 grains of barley compared to 3000 grains of
small millets.”
6 A secondary argument was the absence of Egyptian-style pottery from strata in
Philistine settlements.
7 Forber and Griffith (2011) seem to share Turner’s pessimistic view, while Cleland
(2002, 2011) and Jeffares (2010) maintain a more sanguine opinion about the
prospects of retrieving and interpreting traces of past events and states-of-affairs.
Tucker (2011) offers a context-dependent analysis and Currie (2015, 2018) stresses
the possibilities of reasoning about the past that do not involve direct inference from
traces.
8 Pedersen and Kallestrup (2013) expanded Goldberg’s analysis from the alethic to the
evidential context.
9 Carrier (2012, p. 217) makes a similar point in regard to evidence for the historicity
of Jesus.
10 For instance, two detailed reports on the eruption of the Vesuvius, written by Pliny
the Younger for Tacitus, do not mention the destruction of Pompeii and
Herculaneum. McGrew (2014) has more examples.
11 That is, did not exist when they could have existed. We are confident that pterodactyls
perished because their natural habitat (unlike that of the coelacanths) makes is very
unlikely that they still existed today and, more importantly, that if they were than “we
should have had (verifiable) evidence for it by now.”
12 Chapman and Wylie (2016) prefer to speak of “warranting assumptions or, more
broadly … the scaffolding on which archaeologists rely to identify and mobilize data
as evidence.” It is the iterative, scaffolding-like employment of data and auxiliary
hypothesis, they stress, that creates “ the capacity of surviving traces to bear witness to
pasts that are otherwise unimagined or unimaginable.”
13 Compare this to McGrew (2014, p. 228) assertion that “Anyone who puts forward an
argument from silence in historical enquiry should offer explicit arguments for each
of the three claims…” (that the events or facts in question would have been noticed
and recorded at the past and that the records would have survived and come to notice
today).
14 Interestingly, Stephens mentioned archaeology as a discipline that makes use of
arguments from absence. He does not elaborate, however, nor gives any specific
examples.
15 This follows simply from the mathematical truism that if evidence is more likely
under a particular hypothesis than under its negation, than the opposite is true for the
lack of such evidence (Strevens, 2009, p. 93).
16 “False positives” signals are considered by Sober and Forber and Griffith, but not by
McGrew (probably because he considers the possibility of encountering a falsified
historical document negligible).
17 Strictly speaking, this “screening off” assumption is an approximation. The
approximation is reasonable, however, under most circumstances, and modifying it
would complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative result.
18 The appropriate measure for the degree of confirmation of hypotheses by evidence is
a matter of debate (Eells and Fitelson, 2000; Sober, 2008, pp. 16–74; Zalabardo, 2009).
I believe that, at least for the situations discussed below, the likelihoodist framework
is the most useful.
19 This is something on which all the sources cited above agree. For Bayesians, this
factor modifies the ratio of prior probabilities P(~H)/P(H) (Salmon, 1990, pp.
191–192), while likelihoodist avoid discussing priors and regard the likelihood ratio
as a measure of confirmation.
20 Strevens shows (pp. 98–99) that under the screening-off approximation mentioned
above a similar problem does not exist when computing the strength of “positive”
inference (inferring common ancestry from evidence for a particular
intermediate form).
21 Search strategies developed to increase the probability of detection such as repeated
sweeps, crew selection, and training enhance probability of detection and with it the
security of inference from absence.
22 If p= 1 the strength of the positive inference will be inversely proportional to “noise”
probability of stray traces.
23 Example for q= 0.5, α= 0.8 and p= 1, R+= 2 and R−= 3.
24 Cleland (2011, p. 20) posits that all inferences and explanations in the historical
sciences are primarily local. Sober (1988, p. 123) defends a similar idea (concerning in
particular parsimony assumptions) and Norton (2003) maintains that all inductive
inference is local.
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